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REQUIREMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE CONSENT
TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH
In recent years the courts have tended to guard individual
rights guaranteed by the Constitution more closely than ever
before. Waiver of these rights is now carefully scrutinized to
insure that an individual's rights have not been infringed. For
example, in Miranda v. Arizona' the United States Supreme
Court set down definite rules to guarantee that one's fifth
amendment rights would remain inviolate. But while the question of fifth amendment rights appears to be settled, there are
many questions concerning other rights stemming from the
Constitution which remain unanswered.
One of these questions concerns the waiver of fourth amendment rights. Necessity often compels police to search property
without warrants but with the "consent" of the owner. Very
often incriminating evidence is found in such searches. But did
the owner actually waive his fourth amendment rights? When is
his consent sufficient? What are the requirements of a valid
consent? This comment shall attempt to discover answers to
these questions.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution declares, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures .... -2 State constitutions generally contain almost
identical guarantees. 3 Such constitutional provisions were designed to protect the people from abuses of police power. 4 To
guarantee these rights to the people, stringent requirements for
5
search warrants were developed.
The Supreme Court did not apply the provisions of the fourth
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

For an explanation of the holdings in this case

see note 33 infra.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

8See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 2, §6.
4 The supreme court in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)

stated:
The knock at the door, whether by day or by night as a prelude to a
search, without authority of law but solely on the autAority of the police,
did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as in-

consistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history
and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples.
Id. at 28.

5 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
This case carefully traces the
history of the search warrant by starting with early English history and
progressing to the use of the general warrants in the American colonies and
the development of the fourth amendment. The requirements for a valid
warrant are then analyzed in the light of this historical development.
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amendment to the states until the leading case of Mapp v. Ohio6
was decided in 1961. This case held that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment required the states to comply with
fourth amendment provisions. This meant that the "exclusionary rule" as followed by the federal courts now applied to
the states so that evidence seized as a result of an unreasonable
search and seizure would not be admissible against the defendant.7
The Mapp case did not determine whether the federal
standards of probable cause for the issuance of search warrants
would apply to the states. This question was answered in 1963
by the Supreme Court in Ker v. California.8 In this case the
Court imposed the federal standards on the states and crystallized the federal requirements of probable cause which had to
be met before a search warrant may be issued. The Court did
not disturb the earlier decisions which had outlined exceptions
to the general rule requiring the use of search warrants. These
exceptions were historically three in number: where the searches
were incident to a lawful arrest with a warrant ;9 where the circumstances indicated an emergency justifying a search by police
officers,1° and where the constitutional protection has been
waived by the consent of the person whose property is to be
searched.1 It is this third exception which will be explored.
Matters on the authority to give a valid consent and standing to
2
object to an invalid consent will not be dealt with here.'
As courts are in full agreement that the fourth amendment
rights are personal rather than property rights, it is the person in
possession of the property in question who is given the protection
of the fourth amendment." Thus, even if the police officers act
in good faith and reliance upon the belief that the person giving
consent has the right to do so, the fact that the consenting person
6367 U.S. 643 (1961).

7 The "exclusionary rule" is a rule of evidence formulated by the Su-

preme Court in a long series of cases beginning with Weeks v. United States,

232 U.S. 383 (1914).

Basically, the Court held that the fourth amendment

barred the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure.
The court continually adhered to and expanded this rule until it was finally
applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8374 U.S. 23 (1963).
9 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Carroll v. United States,

267 U.S. 132 (1924) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
1o Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924) ; Weeks v. United States 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11 Cantrell v. United States, 15 F.2d 953 (5th ir. 1926), cert. denied,

273 U.S. 768 (1927).

12 See, Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHI.
L. Ruv. 797 (1966); Comment, Search and Seizure, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 611,
620-23 (1964).
'- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Calhoun v. United
States, 172 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 938 (1949);
People v. Miller, 40 Ill. 2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.

961 (1968).
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does not have possessory rights over the property will make his
consent invalid. 1' If two people have equal rights in the property, either may give a valid consent to the search of that
property, 15 and, likewise, co-tenants may bind the other by giving
to
a valid consent. 16 Similarly, a spouse can generally consent
17
a search of the house when the other is the defendant.

Of

course, one without sufficient possessory interests may never give
a valid consent.1 8 The problem of possessing standing to complain of the possible violation of a constitutional right is similar
to the problem of possessing sufficient interest to give a valid
consent, and it is generally held that only a person possessing
such an interest has standing to complain. 19 Thus, a defendant
cannot question the validity of a consent to a warrantless search
if that search was on the property of another and there was no
right of possession in the defendant at the time of the search.20
However, some courts have recently begun to hold that when a
defendant's constitutional21 rights are at stake they cannot be
waived by a third party.
CONSENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

The federal courts have traditionally placed a heavy burden
on the prosecution to show that consent was given when a
warrantless search has taken place. In the 1962 case of United
14People v. Miller, 40 Ill. 2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 961 (1968).
15 United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Stein v. United
States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948) ; People v. Shambley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954) ; People v. Smith, 108
Ill. App. 2d 172, 246 N.E.2d 689 (1969) ; People v. Preston, 88 Ill. App. 2d
107, 231 N.E.2d 704 (1967).
16 People v. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d 172, 246 N.E.2d 689 (1969); State
v. McCarty, 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967), vacated on other grounds, 392
U.S. 308 (1968); People v. Pelow, 24 N.Y.2d 161, 247 N.E.2d 150 (1969).
17 United States v. Sergio, 21 F. Supp. 553 (D.C.N.Y. 1937); People v.
Perroni, 14 Ill. 2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 980
(1959). But see, Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1930).
18 See, e.g., People v. Weinstein, 105 Ill. App. 2d 1, 245 N.E.2d 788
(1968) where a wife was prosecuted for the murder of her husband. The
deceased's father was administrator of the estate, and the defendant wife
was barred by an order of the probate court from entering the house. The
court held that the father did not, as administrator, have possessory rights
great enough to allow a warrantless search of the house.
19 State v. Craddock, 272 N.C. 160, 158 S.E.2d 25 (1967).
20 See 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, supra note 12. While this article carefully outlines the law on this subject, the writer concludes with a recommendation that a valid consent must be obtained from all persons with
rights in the property in question. It would appear that a requirement such
as this would raise numerous collateral issues at the evidence hearing as
many people may have rights in a given piece of property. In addition, it
would make a warrantless search virtually impossible for the police as they
would have to ascertain title, possession, leases, liens, and such on the property and then obtain permission from all the persons who had an interest
in this property. Such a solution would certainly be most unworkable.
21 People v. Miller, 40 Ill. 2d 154, 238 N.E.2d 407 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 961 (1968) ; Maxey v. State, 244 N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 1969). At the
present time there is little case law on this subject. The courts seldom ques-
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States v. Page,22 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
carefully outlined the federal law on this topic. The court first
stated that the question of the circumstances surrounding the
consent to a warrantless search is a question of fact for the trial
court. 23 The prosecution has a heavy burden of proof which can
be sustained only by clear and positive proof that such consent
was given. 24 In order for the consent to be effective, the government must prove that there was actual consent by the person
with possessory rights in the property to be searched, and that
there was no duress or coercion either express or implied against
this person by the government authorities. 25 In addition, the
government must prove that the consent was unequivocal and
This
specific and that it was freely and intelligently given.2
definition has generally been followed by the federal courts with
little change in the elements required for consent to be valid.
27
The only major exception occurred in United States v. Blalock
in which the court went even further and stated that a warrantless search is prima facie unconstitutional, and to refute this
the government must prove that there was an intentional abandonment of a known right which was freely and intelligently
given with no coercion by the government authorities. 2 The
intelligently waive
court went on to say that a person cannot
29
a right unless he is aware of that right.
The federal courts will look at all the facts concerning, and
the circumstances surrounding, the alleged consent to see
whether the elements of a valid consent are present. In United
States v. Smith,3° the court was faced with a situation in which
there had been a lawful arrest of the defendant who was found
with heroin in his possession. He then freely took the government officers to his apartment and showed them the hiding place
of more heroin. The court felt that the voluntary acts of the
defendant showed that his consent to the search was valid.
However, in later cases the federal courts began to place
tion a defendant's right to object to a warrantless search where the consent
was given by another with rights in the property. In these cases the fact
that the defendant's constitutional rights may have been infringed gives him
standing to question the validity of the consent. Of course, the prosecution
may still deny the defendant's standing and bring up the question in this
manner. Apparently this is seldom done as this problem of standing is
seldom in issue on appeal.
22 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962).
23 Id. at 83.
24 Id. at 83, 84.
25 Id. at 83.
See dlso, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
28 Id.
27255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
28
Id. at 269.
29 Id.
30308 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 906 (1962).
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more and more emphasis on the element of "intelligent" waiver.
The 1965 case of Commonwealth v. Cave1131 was similar to Smith.
In Cavell the defendant was lawfully arrested for murder. He
then told the authorities where he lived and rode with them ten
miles to his home. He did not object in any way to the search
in which incriminatory evidence was found and seized. The
court held that the search and seizure were unconstitutional as
there had been no affirmative, intelligent waiver of the defendant's fourth amendment rights.
In 1966 Miranda v. Arizona 32 was decided by the Supreme
Court. This case concerned the defendant's waiver of a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and the court concluded that
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination cannot be
waived unless the defendant was fully apprised of his rights and
completely warned of the consequences of such self-incrimination.3 3 Miranda,it may be noted, was not concerned with fourth
amendment rights but only with the rights found in the fifth
amendment. At this time there was no mention of whether
Miranda warnings would apply to the waiver of other constitutional rights, nor was there an indication as to whether other
constitutional rights would be surrounded with similar safeguards.
The federal courts did begin to guard other constitutional
rights more closely after the Miranda decision. The first case in
which this problem arose was United States v. Nikrasch.3 4 This
case concerned a conviction for transporting a stolen car across
state lines. The defendant was jailed after a lawful arrest,
and while in custody, he gave the police permission to search his
car if they desired. Incriminating evidence was found, and the
court faced the question of whether or not the consent was valid.
It concluded that one cannot intelligently waive his fourth
amendment rights and give a valid consent to a warrantless
search until he has been apprised of his rights.
Another 1966 case which dealt with the same problem was
31244 F. Supp. 560 (M. D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1004 (1966).
32384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3 Briefly stated, Miranda requires that before a person in custody can

be subjected to interrogation he must be informed that he has a right to
remain silent. He must also be warned that anything he says will be used
against him and that he has a right to consult with an attorney and have
an attorney present during the interrogation. He must also be advised
that he may request that a lawyer be appointed for him. If the police obtain a confession after these warnings have been given and there is no attorney present to protect the defendant at that time, there still remains a
strong presumption that the confession was obtained under coercion, and
the prosecution must clearly show that the confession was not so obtained.
34367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1966).
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United States v. Blalock 35 mentioned earlier. In addition to holding that a warrantless search is prima facie unconstitutional,
the court stated that the defendant must be aware of his fourth
amendment rights before he can intelligently waive them. The
court noted that the Miranda warnings had been given to the
defendant before the search by the authorities but went on to say
that these warnings concern the fifth amendment rather than
the fourth amendment rights. The observation was made that the
Miranda warnings do not advise one that he has a right to refuse
3 6
a warrantless search.
Not all federal courts have followed the Blalock decision.
In 1967 the first circuit reasoned somewhat differently in Gorman v. United States.3 7 After a lawful arrest the defendant was
given the Miranda warnings and was specifically advised that he
did not have to answer any questions. Subsequently, the defendant gave permission for the search of his luggage which contained incriminating evidence. While the court did acknowledge
that other circuits were requiring specific fourth amendment
warnings prior to an effective consent, this court felt that the
Miranda warnings were sufficient to put one on notice of his
rights. The court then observed that the defendant did reply to
the question concerning his consent to the search even after he
was informed that he did not have to answer any question. Such a
reply was believed to be an effective waiver of his fourth
amendment rights.88 The court did not find that the defendant had been coerced even though he was under arrest at the
time he consented to the search. "[B]owing to events, even if
one is not happy about them, is not the same thing as being
coerced." 39 This court expressly rejected the strict rules outlined in Nikrasch and Blalock.40
The first circuit continued to find effective waiver without
specific warnings in Manni v. United States41 where the court
merely noted that the facts related occurred prior to the Miranda
decision which was not to be applied retroactively.4 2 Because of
35255 F. Supp. 268 (E. D. Pa. 1966). The defendant was apprehended
and searched in the washroom of a hotel on the suspicion of bank robbery.
He denied any knowledge of this robbery and consented to a search of his
room to show that he had nothing to hide. It was during this search that
part of the stolen money was found.
36 Id. at 269.
37 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967).
38 Id. at 163, 164.
39
Id. at 165.
40
Id. at 164.
41391 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 873 (1968).
This
involved a conviction under the Federal Firearms Act where the defendant
had allowed officers to search his room before having been given the benefit
of sufficient warning.
42 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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this, the court did not decide whether the Mirandadecision would
apply to searches and seizures.
The seventh circuit has drawn a compromise between these
extremes. Rather than requiring specific fourth amendment
warnings, this circuit will examine all the facts surrounding the
alleged consent to see whether all the elements of an effective
consent are present. Thus, in United States v. Miller43 where
federal agents had warned the defendant that he did not have
to allow them to search his garage, the court felt that his consent
was valid and effective as he was aware that he could exclude
the federal officers if he so desired. The fifth circuit uses the
same test, s evidenced by Phelper v. Decker 4 in which no specific fourth amendment warnings were given to the defendant
although he was given the Miranda warnings at the time of his
arrest. The court concluded there that when all the facts were
looked at collectively, the conclusion was unmistakable that
the
45
defendant's consent was made voluntarily and knowingly.
The third circuit, however, has continued to guard the
fourth amendment rights more closely than any other circuit
as shown by two recent decisions from the district court of
Delaware. In United States v. Moderacki40 the defendant moved
to suppress evidence found by postal inspectors who had asked
him to empty his pockets prior to putting the defendant under
arrest. At this time, he had been under questioning and had
been given Miranda warnings very carefully. The inspectors
had prepared these warnings on printed cards and had given
the defendant one of these cards to read. After he had done so,
the inspectors asked him to read the card aloud to them. They
then discussed the warnings one additional time. Despite these
precautions, the court held that the warnings were insufficient
and that the government had failed to prove an intelligent waiver
of his rights under the fourth amendment. Even though the
defendant was advised of his fifth amendment rights, he could
not consent to a warrantless search without being explicitly
advised of his fourth amendment rights.4 7 The court held that
43 395
44401
45

F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968).
F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1968).

The facts in this case are somewhat unusual.

convicted of possessing obscene photographs.

The defendant was

He was personally acquainted

with the police officers involved and had on earlier occasions allowed them to
see these pictures which were in his house. Apparently the defendant did not
think that these photos were obscene. A few weeks after the authorities
bad seen the pictures, the defendant was arrested and taken to the police
station where he was given the Miranda warnings. It seems as though he
remained on friendly terms with the officers who then drove him to his home
and allowed him to go in by himself and explain the circumstances of his
arrest to his wife. When he was finished he allowed the officers in and let
them search for the pictures.
4" 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968).
47 Id. at 636.
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the key to voluntary waiver was "knowing" what was being
waived and that this could not be proved by the prosecution
unless actual rather than implied warnings were given.48
However, the same court did find effective waiver in United
States v. Morton Provision Company49 in which the defendants
had been in communication with their attorneys prior to the
search and seizure and obviously knew that they did not have
to consent to a warrantless search. The defendants contended,
however, that they did not know the consequences of such a
search or that the evidence discovered could be used against
them. The court refused to sustain this contention in these
circumstances as the defendants had ample legal advice.
In summary it can be seen that the federal courts are hesitant to find an effective waiver of a defendant's fourth amendment rights. There was a heavy burden of proof on the prosecution to show that all elements of an effective waiver have been
met. Presently, there is some disagreement as to whether Miranda warnings are necessary and whether Miranda warnings
are even sufficient to show an intelligent waiver of this constitutional right.
CONSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court has not directly answered the question
of the requirements of an effective consent. An attempt to raise
5°
this point was made by the defendant in Hoffa v. United States,
51
but the court ruled against the defendant on other grounds. '
The question was again raised in Katz v. United States52 which
is the case bringing wiretapping within the protection of the
fourth amendment. The court merely stated that a search to
which the defendant consents meets the fourth amendment requirements but declined to comment on the elements of a valid
consent.
The Supreme Court again touched this issue in 1968 in
Bumper v. North Carolina.53 This case concerned a prosecution
for rape in which the defendant's grandmother allowed authorities to make a search. She believed they had a valid warrant,
but it was later found that the warrant was defective. The
Supreme Court held that the prosecution has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given and that
48

Id.

49 295 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1968).

5o 387 U.S. 231 (1967).

51 Hoffa had invited a government spy into his apartment and later
complained that this was an illegal search and seizure as Hoffa didn't know
this individual was a spy sent by the government.

The court ruled that

there was no government intrusion as the defendant himself had invited
the spy into his room.
52389 U.S. 347 (1967).
r'3391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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there can be no effective consent where there has been any coercion.5 4
Thus, any consent whatsoever after the authorities
profess to have a warrant will not stand.5 5 However, the court
did not go into the "intelligent" element of effective consent.
CONSENT IN THE STATE COURTS

While the federal courts are not in complete agreement on
what constitutes effective consent, there is uniformity in that all
the courts require clear and convincing proof of an intelligent
and voluntary waiver of one's rights. The state courts are even
more divided on this issue and show little, if any, uniformity.
The following recent decisions point up the widely divergent
views which are taken.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska attacked the problem in
1966 shortly after the Miranda decision in State v. Forney.5 6
The court stated that it refused to apply the Miranda decision
to fourth amendment rights as this would shackle law enforcement. The court held that consent is effective if it is voluntarily
and freely given but made no mention of the requirement that
consent be knowingly or intelligently given. A three point syllabus was included in the court's decision: first, Miranda does
not apply to the fourth amendment; second, the requirements of
the fourth amendment are met by having the affirmative burden
of proof on the prosecution; and third, consent can be shown by
acts as well as words. This reasoning has been followed by the
state of Kansas as evidenced by State v. McCarty.57 Again the
court held that Miranda controls the violation of fifth amendment rights only and must not be applied to unreasonable
searches and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment.
Likewise, Maryland has refused to apply Miranda to the fourth
amendment nor has it surrounded this amendment with similar
protections against its violation.58
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has also decided against
such safeguards. In 1967 the opinion in State v. Andrus59 was
written in which the court took notice of the conflicting views
held across the nation in arriving at its decision. This court
reasoned that the fourth amendment applies only to unreasonable
searches and seizures. When the consent is freely and intelli54

d. at 548.

55 Id. at 549.

56 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967). Here the defendant was being
questioned in the police station prior to being arrested or informed of his
Miranda rights. When asked if the police could search his car, the defendant led them outside and allowed them to do so. A gun was then found
and seized as evidence. It was at this time that the defendant was arrested
and given the Mirandawarnings.
57 199 Kan. 116, 427 P.2d 616 (1967).
58 Lamot U. State, 2 Md. App. 378, 234 A.2d 615 (1967).
51 250 La. 765, 199 So. 2d 867 (1967).
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gently given, the search is no longer unreasonable even though
the fourth amendment rights have not been explained to the defendant.60 This court also refused to draw a distinction between
the cases where the defendant is under arrest at the time the
consent is given and the cases where there has been no arrest.
While some courts felt that the fact of the arrest is prima facie
evidence of coercion, 61 this court held that there is no real difference in these instances which would require such results.
Instead, when the trial court finds that the consent was given
after an arrest, it should merely put the question of consent
under more severe scrutiny.

62

Other courts have more carefully guarded the fourth amendment rights. For example, the Oregon courts have followed the
federal courts by closely scrutinizing an alleged consent. This
issue was decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in State v.
Williams 3 in 1967. This case concerned a burglary prosecution
in which the defendant was originally arrested for vagrancy.
He was given no warnings about his rights and was asked to
empty his pockets. A key to a locker in the local bus station
was found, and the defendant gave police permission to get his
bags from this locker. The police found stolen items in the
locker and charged the defendant with burglary. At this time
the Miranda warnings were given. In a four to three decision,
the court held "the request to search is a request that the defendant be a witness against himself .... ,,64 The court further
held that the principles of Miranda as well as the principles of
Escobedo v. Illinoisos are applicable to interrogations aimed at
obtaining consent to make a search when the defendant is in
custody.66
The Supreme Court of North Carolina felt the question of
whether the defendant was in custody of the police at the time
the consent was given was an important factor in determining
whether or not there was an effective waiver of his right. In
State v. Craddock,67 where the defendant was not in police custody, the court held that, "[m] erely asking a defendant for consent to search the automobile is not prohibited by the Miranda
decision."6' 8 However, the court did not pass directly on the
effectiveness of such consent other than to say that Miranda was
10
Id. at 782, 199 So. 2d at 873.
61
See, e.g., United States v. Shrobshire, 271 F. Supp. 521 (D.C. La.
1967).
62 State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 783-84, 199 So.2d 867, 873 (1967).
s 248 Ore. 85, 432 P.2d 679 (1967).
64 Id. at 93, 432 P.2d 683.
65 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
66 State v. Williams, 248 Ore. 85, 93, 432 P.2d 679, 683 (1967).
67 272 N.C. 160, 158 S.E.2d 25 (1967).
68 Id. at 170, 158 S.E.2d at 32.
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not applicable in all situations. The Rhode Island courts also
appear to be following the more liberal federal court rulings and
will find effective consent by looking at all the circumstances
surrounding the consent even though explicit warnings have not
been given.6 9

The problem of consent was presented in 1968

in State v. Leavitt70 where the defendant had been arrested and
given the Miranda warnings. While in the police station he was
asked if the police could search his car. He replied "Sure" and
tossed the keys to the police. The court held that the consent
was valid and confirmed his murder conviction.
While some courts have definitely stated their positions in
regard to effective consent, others have been quite cautious in
approaching this question and, in some instances, have refrained
from committing themselves. Typical of these cases is the
7 1 decided by the Surecent case of Commonwealth v. Garrefi
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In this case the defendant's car had been stopped at night by the police, and he was
asked to show the automobile registration but was unable to
comply as he could not find it. The defendant then asked the
police to enter the car and assist him by searching the glove
compartment. In the process of this search burglary tools were
found and the defendant was placed under arrest. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the failure to give any Miranda warnings negated any consent he may have given. In
support of this contention, the defendant cited California v.
Stewart, a companion case of Miranda.72 The circumstances were
somewhat similar in the two cases, but in Stewart the defendant
was already under arrest at the time of the search. However,
the court did not feel that Stewart was controlling inasmuch as
the reversal of that conviction was based not upon the illegal
search but rather on incriminating statements made by Stewart
after his arrest. The court also distinguished the present case
from Stewart in that in the former the defendant was not under
arrest and only a threshold inquiry was being conducted. Thus,
the court disposed of the question by drawing distinctions between the two cases but did not give a clear holding on what
constitutes effective consent.
CONSENT IN ILLINOIS COURTS

Illinois is another state which has not clearly stated a position on the question of effective consent. The first case to face
69 State v. Leavitt, 237 A.2d 309 (R.I. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 881

(1968).

Id.

70
71245

N.E.2d 442 (Mass. 1969).
72384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the question squarely since Miranda was People v. Trent 3 decided in 1967 by the appellate court. This case concerned a
conviction for armed robbery in 1964. Defendants were stopped
while driving their automobile on the charge of having obscured
license plates. Initially one defendant was arrested for driving
without a valid license and the other was charged with allowing
an unauthorized person to use his automobile. There was conflicting testimony on whether the owner then consented to the
search of the car. During this search evidence of a prior robbery was found, and the defendant was later convicted for this
robbery. As the question of the circumstances surrounding the
alleged consent was a question of fact, on appeal the findings
of the trial74 court were not disturbed as they were not clearly
erroneous.
The defendant next contended that his consent to the search
was not valid since he had not been given the Miranda warnings.
The court dismissed this contention on the grounds that Miranda
concerned only the fifth amendment rights and not those of the
fourth amendment. The court concluded that the rights protected
are entirely different and Miranda should not be controlling in
connection with fourth amendment problems.75 However, the
court then went on to dismiss the same contention on two different grounds. First, the court noted that this occurred prior to the
76
Miranda decision which was not to be applied retroactively.
Secondly, the court observed that since this point had not been
raised in the trial court it could not be raised on appeal. 77 As
these two grounds completely decided the question in point, the
earlier discussion by the court in which it held that Miranda
does not apply to the fourth amendment was not necessary to
78
the disposition of the case and can be classified as mere dictum.
The Supreme Court of Illinois was then presented with the
problem of effective consent to a warrantless search in People
v. Ledferd7 1 which was decided in 1967 shortly after the Trent
case. In this case the defendant was arrested for armed robbery
and placed in a police car. According to police testimony, the
defendant gave them permission to search his apartment and
raised himself in his seat while handcuffed so that the police
73 85 Ill. App. 2d 157 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967).
74
7

Id. at 161, 228 N.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 161-62, 228 N.E.2d at 537-38.

Unfortunately, the court

failed to give its reasoning in support of this conclusion.
76 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
77 People v. Trent, 85 Ill. App. 2d 157, 162, 228 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1967).
78 Because these arguments were not necessary to the disposition of the
case, one can only surmise as to the court's reason for including them if

other than to show the court's views and possible tendancies in deciding a
subsequent case on this point.
79

38 Ill. 2d 607, 232 N.E.2d 684 (1967).
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could remove the key from his pocket. The defendant denied
such consent and maintained that even if it had been given it
was invalid as he had not yet received the Miranda warnings.
As to the first question, the court held that whether consent has
been given is a question of fact for the trial court whose determination will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. 0 Since this is a question of fact, the prosecution's evidence
will be presumed to be an accurate account of the circumstances
surrounding the consent, search, and seizure.
The remaining question concerned the validity of the consent as it was presented by the prosecution. The court acknowledged the apparent split between the nation's courts on this subject and stated,
This court is not prepared to hold that the People must show under
circumstances such as were concerned here, not only the consent by
the defendants to the search, but also that he was advised of rights
secured by the fourth amendment.81
The supreme court again considered the consent problem in
1968 in People v. Haskell8 2 This time the court took what would
initially appear to be a completely different stand and became
extremely hesitant to find a waiver of fourth amendment rights.
This appeal concerned a conviction for murder. The defendant
had been arrested in his home at about 2:30 A.M. and was taken
to jail. There was conflicting testimony on whether the defendant gave police permission to return to his home which was
still occupied by his nineteen year old wife to search for the
murder weapon. In any event, the police did return to the
house between 6:00 and 7:00 A.M. that morning and informed
the wife that they had been sent by her husband to get his gun.
She initially denied any knowledge of such a gun, but after some
conversation with the police, she went upstairs and brought
down her husband's gun.
There were three main issues raised on appeal. The first
concerned the wife's standing to waive a right also held by
her defendant husband as well as his standing to complain of a
violation of her rights. The court held that a wife could give
effective consent but that the husband can also raise this question as his rights would have been interfered with had the
consent not been valid.8 3 The second question was whether the
wife had actually given permission to seize the evidence. Here
the court followed its previous holding in Ledferd that this is a
question of fact for the trial court and is not open to review
8oId. at 610, 232 N.E.2d at 686.

81

/d.
82 41 Ill. 2d 25, 241 N.E.2d 430 (1968).

83

Id. at 28, 241 N.E.2d at 432-33.
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unless obviously in error.s4 Because of this, the court then accepted without question the testimony of the police officers as to
the facts and circumstances surrounding the consent.
Last, the court had to decide whether the consent was
effective assuming the truth of the prosecution's evidence concerning the consent. Here the court made what would apparently be a complete departure from its previous holding in
Ledferd. The following quotation from the decision shows the
heavy emphasis placed on the holdings of the federal courts and
their tests for a valid consent to a warrantless search:
[C]onsent must be proved by clear and positive testimony, and it
must be established that there was no duress or coercion, actual or
implied. (Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65
L.Ed 654; Judd v. United States, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 64, 190 F.2d
649, 651.) The prosecution must show a consent that is "unequivical and specific" (Karwicki v. United States, (4th cir.) 55 F.2d
225, 226), "freely and intelligently given". (Kovach v. United
States, (6th cir.) 53 F.2d 639.) "Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461.5
Using this test, the court concluded that there was no effective
waiver of the fourth amendment rights even though the facts
were viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. The
court felt that since the wife was not informed of the rights
involved, she could not intelligently waive these rights.86 It may
be noted that much of the opinion deals with other facts surrounding the consent. The court noted the tender age of the
wife, the fact that her husband had been taken from her by the
police during the night, and the fact that she had again been
aroused by the police in the early morning hours. All of these
factors appeared to influence the court in reaching its decision
that the wife did not freely and intelligently give consent to a
warrantless search and seizure.87 At the same time the court
did acknowledge its earlier holdings in Ledferd and expressly
stated that Ledferd was not being overruled. The court made it
clear that warnings of one's fourth amendment rights do not
have to be given in all circumstances but that the presence or
84

Id. at 30, 241 N.E.2d at 433.

85 Id. at 31, 241 N.E.2d at 433-34.
86 Id. at 31-32, 241 N.E.2d at 434.
87 The court also appeared impressed by the ballistics evidence which
was used to link the defendant's gun with the murder weapon. It was observed that the ballistics expert found different markings when comparing
test bullets with those found in the victim. Additionally, the brand of bullets found in the gun was not the same as those in the victim. The expert
had failed to measure the diameter of the bullets and did not ascertain
whether the gun had been recently fired. This expert even failed to make
the basic test of matching lands and grooves on the bullets with those on
the gun's barrel. It could well be that the court was influenced by such a
lack of evidence when it decided the case on another point.
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absence of these warnings is a "factor bearing on the understanding nature of the consent." 8
The last, and most recent, decision 9 by the Illinois Supreme
Court concerning this area of consent was the 1969 case of
People v. Rhodes.90 This case concerned a murder conviction in
which the police had arrested the defendant and obtained his
permission to search his apartment prior to advising him of his
constitutional rights. In this case the court took no notice of
its holdings in Haskell which had earlier made it appear as
though Illinois courts would follow the federal courts when
fourth amendment questions arise. Indeed, the court merely
cited Ledferd as the present Illinois law on this topic and reaffirmed its earlier holding that in Illinois a person does not have
to be advised of his fourth amendment rights to effectively waive
his right against a warrantless search.
At the present time a cursory examination would suggest
that the Illinois law on the consent requirements is inconsistent.
One decision refused to apply the many federal safeguards although this was apparently done in dicta. This was followed
by a case which quoted at length from the federal cases and
which made it appear as though Illinois would follow the federal
reasoning in closely guarding one's fourth amendment rights.
However, the latest decision disregarded the second one entirely.
On the basis of the wording in the various opinions, one could
conclude that there is ample authority for either side of the
argument.
NEEDED: A BASIC REVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A review of the cases outlined earlier suggests that few
courts agree as to what constitutes an effective consent to a
warrantless search. There is some uniformity and direction
given by the United States Supreme Court in Bumper v. North
Carolinae1 in that consent, after one has been shown an invalid
warrant, is never effective. Also, there can be no consent where
there is coercion, and the prosecution has the burden of proving
that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. But are the
courts really at odds where the other elements of consent are
concerned? Are some courts very strict while others are liberal
in finding consent? Is there possibly a basic thread of consis88 41 Ill. 2d 25, 81, 241 N.E.2d 430, 434 (1968).
89 People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 243 N.E.2d 825 ('1969) is an-

other case decided later in 1968 in which the consent problem arose.

The

court merely held that the circumstances surrounding the consent are to be
decided by the trial court and did not expand on the requirements of an

effective consent.
90 41 Ill. 2d 494, 244 N.E.2d 145 (1969).
91391 U.S. 543 (1968).
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tency running through all of these cases which makes them reconcilable although the express wording of the opinions differs
greatly? To answer these questions, one must fir~t take a
critical look at the rights involved.
When one first thinks of search and seizure in connection
with the fourth amendment, it is easy to think of this amendment as giving property rights. Such a view tends to entirely
distort the meaning of the fourth amendment which in fact has
nothing to do with property rights.12 The fourth amendment
gives personal rights to the citizens so that they may be free

from unreasonable government intrusion.

Likewise, there is

nothing in the fourth amendment or anywhere else in the constitution that calls for an exclusionary rule of evidence. 3 The

so-called "exclusionary rule" is one formed entirely by the courts
in an effort to control the activities of the police. 94 This implies

that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to effectuate
the fourth amendment provisions so that this amendment can
now be enforced by the courts if it is not enforced by the police.
There is, of course, an abundance of criticism over this rule, and
much of it is well-founded.99
However, all the reasoning in
support of such a rule would fail if the police always remained
within the fourth amendment bounds or there were other methods of minimizing the threat of illegal searches.
Another attempt to justify the exclusionary rule was made
92 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949).
93 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914).
In Wolf Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the majority stated:

This ruling [the Exclusionary rule] was made for the first time in
1914. It was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Congressional
policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The decision was a matter of judicial implication.
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). Likewise, in a concurring opinion
Mr. Justice Black stated:
But I agree with what appears to be a plain implication of the Court's
opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the
Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate.
Id. at 39-40.
94 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
91See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). The
majority opinion stated:
The rules of evidence are designed to enable courts to reach the
truth. .

.

.

Evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure is or-

dinarily just as true and reliable as evidence lawfully obtained..
If he is innocent or if there is ample evidence to convict him without the illegally obtained evidence, exclusion of the evidence gives him
no remedy at all. Thus the only defendants who benefit by the exclusionary rule are those criminals who could not be convicted without the
illegally obtained evidence.
Id. at 442-43, 282 P.2d at 910.
Justice Cardoza observed in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (1926), "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."
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by Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio.90
Justice Black stated:
[T]hat when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable
searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against self-incrimination, a constitutional basis
emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule. 97
However, Mr. Justice Black goes on to disclose that this theory
evolves from Boyd v. United States98 in which the incriminating
evidence was composed of private papers and books belonging
to the defendant. In such instances, the two amendments do
protect similar rights because this real evidence is also selfincriminating evidence coming from the words of the defendant.
A broader comparison of the two amendments shows the great
difference between them. While the fifth amendment right is
also a personal right, it is different in that it is a right against
self-incrimination and concerns actual confessions and incriminating statements made by the defendant. The Miranda decision
formed strict requirements so that the police were no longer
able to obtain confessions in violation of this right. It may be
noted that much of the Miranda decision concerns the police
tactics used to extricate confessions, and one can see that the
court was concerned over the abuses of police power. These
requirements gave the courts police powers over the police to
ensure the protection of rights guaranteed by the constitution
but not always enforced by the police.
However, the fourth amendment rights are not concerned
with the nature of incriminating evidence found during a search.
This right concerns only the right to personal security. While
one is apt to give a confession or even a false confession under
coercion or grilling, he is not apt to plant evidence during a
search. The various articles seized in a search are real evidence,
and it is a fact that they were at the place found when they
were found. No amount of police brutality is going to produce
evidence which is not there.9 9 It is elementary that the fourth
amendment does not address itself to evidentiary questions but
rather the right to be free from unreasonable intrusions.
SUMMARY: Is

THERE CONTINUITY?

The very word "unreasonable" could be the key word to
this amendment as it suggests a test which is not only largely
subjective but discretionary as well. As the amendment affords
96 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
97 Id.
at 662.
98 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
99 Obviously it is possible for the police to plant evidence.

This possi-

bility is not under consideration here as the exclusionary rule does nothing
to safeguard against such practices.
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freedom from "unreasonable" searches and seizures only, the
only real question before a trial judge is the reasonableness of
the search. Is it really unreasonable to search property where
the owner does not object? It would appear that a search which
does not degrade or in any other way affect the dignity of the
person whose property is being searched would not be unreasonable. A trial judge could apply a "reasonable man" standard in
which the defendant would be replaced by a completely innocent,
law-abiding reasonable man. If the search would in any way be
obnoxious to such an individual, it would be unreasonable. But
if, under the circumstances, no reasonable man could be offended
in any way by the search, the search would be reasonable. The
trial judge would also have to include some element of subjectivity in the test to protect the sensibilities of the actual defendant. Of course, if there is any evidence of coercion or misrepresentation by the police, the consent would not be valid.
A look at the facts surrounding the cases cited earlier
suggests that the various courts may have used such a test,
though possibly subconsciously, as this test was never expressly
stated. Where the police activity has been blatantly offensive,
the courts have been most reluctant to find a valid consent. On
the other hand, where the police activity has been reasonable
and unoffensive, the courts have generally found the consent
valid. A review of the Illinois cases described above shows this
exact trend in the Illinois courts and suggests that the holdings
are entirely reconcilable if based on a standard of reasonableness
as set forth in the fourth amendment. In fact, Illinois holdings
have consistently required a close look at all circumstances surrounding an alleged consent. Such a requirement would be
useless if, indeed, the elements of "intelligent, knowing" waiver
were actually controlling.
In support of this hypothesis, it may be noted that the
United States Supreme Court has generally denied the defendant's writ of certiorari on the grounds of an unconstitutional
search following an invalid consent. Even when granted as in
Bumper v. North Carolina, the court has not followed the holdings of some of the lower federal courts which have applied
Miranda safeguards to the fourth amendment. It would seem
probable that if the court did feel there was such a similarity
between these rights, at least a mention of this would be made
when a case such as Bumper was being decided
by a court
whose composition was largely the same as when Miranda was
handed down.
The reasoning above does not explain the holdings of some
of the federal courts which require Mirandawarnings and some-

19701

Consent to

Varrantless Search

times additional warnings before there is an effective consent.
Again it must be stated that there is no authority for the proposition that the fourth amendment was designed to aid a defendant
in his efforts to keep evidence from the police. However, the
court-designed exclusionary rule does just that as a side effect
stemming from its main purpose of policing the police. If the
fourth amendment is studied in conjunction with the requirements of the exclusionary rule, holdings requiring such warnings
are justifiable, not for constitutional reasons, but as an extension
of the courts' power over the police. Such will aid the courts
in their efforts to insure police adherence to the fourth amendment standards. The recurring idea of "intelligent waiver" is
without justification as there is nothing in the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness which could possibly suggest that a waiver must be intelligently made. Nor is there,
as has been stated before, any rational basis for drawing a
correlation between the fifth and fourth amendments which are
so vastly different in their operations, purposes, and effects.
In short, it would appear that most of the cases involving
the question of valid consent to a warrantless search are reconcilable if a strict constitutional interpretation is given to the
fourth amendment. The confusion of inconsistent holdings
arises not because the holdings and decisions are truly inconsistent but rather because the courts have failed to adequately
analyze and examine the nature of the rights involved. Even
though there is no rational basis for correlating fifth amendment rights with those of the fourth, some courts have found it
convenient to do so, not on a strict constitutional basis, but
rather as a means to extend the courts' control over the police.
Dudley E. Owens

